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


THE DARKER SIDE OF WESTERN MODERNITY

Global Futures, Decolonial Options

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The Darker Side of Western Modernity

INTRODUCTION

Coloniality

The Darker Side of Western Modernity

I WAS INTRIGUED, many years ago (around 1991), when I saw on the “news” stand in a bookstore the title of Stephen Toulmin’s latest book: *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (1990). I went to a coffee shop, across the street from Borders, in Ann Arbor, and devoured the book, with a cup of coffee. What was the hidden agenda of modernity?—was the intriguing question. Shortly after that I was in Bogotá and found a book just published: *Los conquistados: 1492 y la población indígena de las Américas*, edited by Heraclio Bonilla (1992). The last chapter of that book caught my attention. It was by Anibal Quijano, of whom I had heard, but with whom I was not familiar. The essay, also later published in the journal *Cultural Studies*, was titled “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality.” I got the book and found another coffee shop nearby, where I devoured the essay, the reading of which was a sort of epiphany. At that time I was finishing the manuscript of *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* (1995), but I did not incorporate Quijano’s essay. There was much I had to think about, and my manuscript was already framed. As soon as I handed the manuscript to the press, I concentrated on “coloniality” which became a central concept in *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledge and Border Thinking* (2000). After the publication of this book, I wrote a lengthy theoretical article, “Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,” which appeared in *South Atlantic Quarterly* (2002). For Toulmin, the hidden agenda of modernity was the humanistic river running behind instrumental reason. For me,

the hidden agenda (and darker side) of modernity was coloniality. What follows is a recap of the work I have done since, in collaboration with members of the collective modernity/coloniality.¹

The Hidden Agenda

“Coloniality,” as I explained in the preface and hinted at in the previous paragraph, was a concept introduced by the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that I further developed in *Local Histories/Global Designs* and other publications that followed. Coloniality has been conceived and explored as the darker side of modernity since then. Quijano gave a new meaning to the legacy of the term *colonialism*, particularly as it was conceptualized during the Cold War in tandem with the concept of “decolonization” (and the struggles for liberation in Africa and Asia). Coloniality names the underlying logic of the foundation and unfolding of Western civilization from the Renaissance to today of which historical colonialisms have been a constitutive, although downplayed, dimension. The concept as used herein, and by the collective modernity/coloniality, is not intended to be a totalitarian concept, but rather one that specifies a particular project: that of the idea of modernity and its constitutive and darker side, coloniality, that emerged with the history of European invasions of Abya Yala, Tawantinsuyu, and Anahuac; the formation of the Americas and the Caribbean; and the massive trade of enslaved Africans. “Coloniality” is already a decolonial concept, and decolonial projects can be traced back to the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. And, last but not least, “coloniality” (e.g., *el patrón colonial de poder*, the colonial matrix of power) is unapologetically the specific response to globalization and global linear thinking that emerged within the histories and sensibilities of South America and the Caribbean. It is one project that does not pretend to become the project. Thus, it is one particular option among those that I call here decolonial option(s). More straightforwardly: the argument that follows takes as its core the colonial matrix of power, and as such, the argument is one among several decolonial options at work (see afterword).

The basic thesis—in the specific universe of discourse as just specified—is the following: “modernity” is a complex narrative whose point of origination was Europe; a narrative that builds Western civilization by celebrating

its achievements while hiding at the same time its darker side, “coloniality.” Coloniality, in other words, is constitutive of modernity—there is no modernity without coloniality. Hence, today’s common expression “global modernities” implies “global colonialities” in the precise sense that the colonial matrix of power is shared and disputed by many contenders: if there cannot be modernity without coloniality, there cannot either be global modernities without global colonialities. Consequently, decolonial thinking and doing emerged and unfolded, from the sixteenth century on, as responses to the oppressive and imperial bent of modern European ideals projected to and enacted in, the non-European world. However, as it was pointed out in the preface, the “awareness and the concept of decolonization,” as a third option to capitalism and communism, materialized in the Bandung and Non-Aligned countries conferences. This is the scenario of the transformation from a polycentric and noncapitalist world before 1500 to a monocentric and capitalist world order from 1500 to 2000 (a topic I explore in chapters 1 and 2).

The Advent of a Four-Headed and Two-Legged Monster

I will start with two scenarios—one from the sixteenth century and the other from the late twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first.

First, let’s imagine the world around 1500. It was, in brief, a polycentric and noncapitalist world. There were several coexisting civilizations, some with long histories, others being formed around that time. In China, the Ming dynasty ruled from 1368 to 1644. China was a center of trade and a civilization with a long history. Around 200 B.C., the Chinese Huángdinate (often wrongly called the “Chinese empire”) coexisted with the Roman empire. By 1500, the former Roman Empire became the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations, which still coexisted with the Chinese Huángdinate ruled by the Ming dynasty. Out of the dismembering of the Islamic caliphate (formed in the seventh century and ruled by the Umayyads in the seventh and eighth centuries, and by the Abassids from the sixth to the thirteenth centuries) in the fourteenth century, three sultanates emerged. The Ottoman Sultanate, in Anatolia, with its center in Constantinople; the Safavid sultanate, with its center in Baku, Azerbaijan; and the Mughal

Sultanate, formed out of the ruins of the Delhi Sultanate that lasted from 1206 to 1526. The Mughals (whose first sultan was Babur, descendent of Genghis Kan and Timur) extended from 1526 to 1707. By 1520, the Moscovites had expelled the Golden Horde and declared Moscow the “Third Rome.” The history of the Russian tsarate began. In Africa, the Oyo Kingdom (around what is today Nigeria), formed by the Yoruba nation, was the largest kingdom in West Africa encountered by European explorers. The Benin and the Oyo Kingdoms were the two largest in Africa. The Benin Kingdom lasted from 1440 to 1897, and the Oyo from 1400 to 1905. Last but not least, the Incas in Tawantinsuyu and the Aztecs in Anáhuac were both sophisticated civilizations by the time of the Spaniards’ arrival. What happened, then, in the sixteenth century that would change the world order, transforming it into the one we live in today? The advent of “modernity” could be a simple and general answer, but . . . when, how, why, where?

In the second scenario, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world is interconnected by a single type of economy (capitalism) and distinguished by a diversity of political theories and practices.² Dependency theory should be reviewed in the light of these changes. But I will limit myself to distinguishing two overall orientations. On the one hand, globalization of a type of economy known as capitalism (which by definition aimed at globalization from its very inception) and the diversification of global politics are taking place. On the other, we are witnessing the multiplication and diversification of anti-neo-liberal globalization (e.g., anti-global capitalism) movements, projects, and manifestations.

With regard to the first orientation, China, India, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and the emerging South American Union have already made clear that they are no longer willing to follow uni-directional orders coming from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or the White House. Behind Iran is the history of Persia and the Safavid Sultanate; behind Iraq, the history of the Ottoman Sultanate. The past sixty years of Western entry into China (Marxism and capitalism) has not replaced China’s history with the history of Europe and the United States since 1500, nor has that occurred with India. On the contrary, Western encroachment has reinforced China’s aim for sovereignty. Post-national is a Western expression that conveys the dreams of and desire for the end of nation-state boundaries and opens doors to free trade. But in the non-European world, post-national

means the affirmation of an identity that preceded the birth of nationalism in Europe and its dispersion around the world. Nationalism is one form of identification confronting the homogenizing forces of globalization. Globalization has two sides: that of the narrative of modernity and that of the logic of coloniality. Those narratives engender different responses; some are being described here as dewesternization and others as decoloniality. Post-nationalism in the West means the end of nationalism, while in the non-European world it means the beginning of a new era in which the concept of nationalism serves to reclaim identities as the basis of state sovereignty. The imperial partition of Africa among Western countries between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth (which provoked the First World War) did not replace the past of Africa with the past of Western Europe. And thus in South America: five hundred years of colonial rules by peninsular officers and, since the early 1900s, by creole and mestizo elites did not erase the energy, force, and memories of the Indian past (compare with current issues in Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, southern Mexico, and Guatemala); nor have the histories and memories of communities of African descent in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and the insular Caribbean been erased.

With regard to the second orientation, I am witnessing many non-official (rather than nongovernmental) transnational organizations not only manifesting themselves “against” capitalism and globalization and questioning modernity, but also opening up global but noncapitalist horizons and delinking from the idea that there is a single and primary modernity surrounded by peripheral or alternative ones. While not necessarily rejecting modernity, these organizations are making clear that modernity goes hand in hand with coloniality and, therefore, that modernity has to be assumed in both its glories and its crimes. Let’s refer to this global domain as “decolonial cosmopolitanism” (to which I return in chapter 7).³

What happened in between the two scenarios outlined above, between the sixteenth century and the twenty-first? The historian Karen Armstrong—looking at the history of the West from the perspective of a historian of Islam—has made two crucial points. Armstrong underscores the singularity of Western achievements in relation to known history until the sixteenth century, noting two salient spheres: economy and epistemology. In the sphere of economy, Armstrong points out, “the new society of Europe

and its American colonies had a different economic basis," which consisted in reinvesting the surplus in order to increase production. The first transformation, according to Armstrong, was thus the radical shift in the domain of economy that allowed the West to "*reproduce its resources indefinitely*" and is generally associated with colonialism.⁴ The second transformation, epistemological, is generally associated with the European Renaissance. Epistemological here shall be extended to encompass both science/knowledge and arts/meaning. Armstrong locates the transformation in the domain of knowledge in the sixteenth century, when Europeans "achieved a scientific revolution that gave them greater control over the environment than anybody had achieved before."⁵ No doubt, Armstrong is right in highlighting the relevance of a new type of economy (capitalism) and the scientific revolution. They both fit and correspond to the celebratory rhetoric of modernity—that is, the rhetoric of salvation and newness, based on European achievements during the Renaissance.

There is, however, a hidden dimension of events that were taking place at the same time, both in the sphere of economy and in the sphere of knowledge: *the dispensability* (or expendability) of *human life* and of life in general from the Industrial Revolution into the twenty-first century. The Afro-Trinidadian, politician, and intellectual Eric Williams succinctly described this situation by noting that "one of the most important consequences of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 . . . was the impetus it gave to the principle of free trade. . . . Only in one particular did the freedom accorded in the slave trade differ from the freedom accorded in other trades—the commodity involved was man."⁶ Thus, hidden behind the rhetoric of modernity, economic practices dispensed with human lives, and knowledge justified racism and the inferiority of human lives that were naturally considered dispensable.

In between the two scenarios described above, the idea of "modernity" came into the picture. It appeared first as a double colonization, of time and of space. I am also arguing that the colonization of space and time are the two pillars of Western civilization, and so I discuss these two crucial concepts in chapters 4 and 5. Colonization of time was created by the Renaissance invention of the Middle Ages, the colonization of space by the colonization and conquest of the New World.⁷ However, modernity came along with coloniality: America was not an existing entity to be discov-

ered. It was invented, mapped, appropriated, and exploited under the banner of the Christian mission. During the time span 1500 to 2000 three cumulative (and not successive) faces of modernity are discernible: the Iberian and Catholic face, led by Spain and Portugal (1500–1750, approximately); the "heart of Europe" (Hegel) face, led by England, France, and Germany (1750–1945); and the U.S. American face, led by the United States (1945–2000). Since then, a new global order has begun to unfold: a polycentric world interconnected by the same type of economy.

Another version of what happened between 1500 and 2000 is that the great transformation of the sixteenth century—in the Atlantic that connected European initiatives, enslaved Africans, dismantled civilizations (Tawantinsuyu and Anáhuac, and the already-in-decay Maya), and encompassed the genocide in Ayiti (which Columbus baptized Hispaniola in 1492)—was the emergence of a structure of control and management of authority, economy, subjectivity, gender and sexual norms and relations that were driven by Western (Atlantic) Europeans (Iberian Peninsula, Holland, France, and England) both in their internal conflicts and in their exploitation of labor and expropriation of land.⁸ Ottobah Cugoano vividly depicted this scenario, in the late eighteenth century, when he described the imperial organization of the slave trade inscribed in the emergence of the triangular Atlantic economy.

That traffic of kidnapping and stealing men was begun by the Portuguese on the coasts of Africa, and as they found the benefit of it for their own wicked purposes, they soon went on to commit greater depredations. The Spaniards followed their infamous example, and the African slave-trade was thought most advantageous for them, to enable themselves to live in ease and affluence by the cruel subjection and slavery of others. The French and English, and some other nations in Europe, as they founded settlements and colonies in West Indies, or in America, went on in the same manner, and joined hand in hand with the Portuguese and Spaniards, to rob and pillage Africa, as well as to waste and desolate the inhabitants of the Western continent.⁹


The narrative stages a dramatic scenario behind which an enduring structure of management and control was being put in place as these kinds of events unfolded in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Control and management means here that the actors and institutions engineering

the game were establishing its rules on which the struggles for decision-making would unfold. Africans and Indians did not participate in the process. Global designs and their implementation were an affair of European Atlantic nations (those mentioned by Ottobah Cugoano). In the process, internal conflicts of interest emerged among Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England in connection with their vested interest in the African slave trade and Indians' land and labor. Thus, in the process the rules of the imperial internal differences (among European imperial states) were established (e.g., the invectives launched by Elizabeth I against the brutality of the Spaniards in the New World that became known as "the Black Legend").¹⁰ These were the conditions that prompted the emergence of a colonial matrix of power.

The Formation and Transformations of "Patrón colonial de poder"

In its original formulation by Quijano, the "patrón colonial de poder" (colonial matrix of power) was described as four interrelated domains: control of the economy, of authority, of gender and sexuality, and of knowledge and subjectivity (see fig. 1). The events unfolded in two parallel directions. One was the struggle among European imperial states, and the other was between these states and their enslaved and exploited African and Indian colonial subjects.

What supports the four "heads" or interrelated spheres of management and control (the world order) are the two "legs," that is, the racial and patriarchal foundation of knowledge (the enunciation in which the world order is legitimized). I explain below—and often return to the idea in subsequent chapters—that the historical foundation of the colonial matrix (and hence of Western civilization) was theological: it was Christian theology that located the distinction between Christians, Moors, and Jews in the "blood." Although the quarrel between the three religions of the book has a long history, it has been reconfigured since 1492, when Christians managed to expel Moors and Jews from the peninsula and enforced conversion on those who wanted to stay. Simultaneously, the racial configuration between Spanish, Indian, and African began to take shape in the New World. By the eighteenth century, "blood" as a marker of race/racism was transferred to skin.



1 Schematic visualization of the colonial matrix of power.

And theology was displaced by secular philosophy and sciences. The Linnaean system of classification helped the cause. Secular racism came to be based on the ego-politics of knowledge; but it so happened that the agents and institutions that embodied secular ego-politics of knowledge were, like those who embodied theo-politics of knowledge, mostly white European males. So, the struggle between *theologism* (I need this neologism here) and *secularism* was a family feud. Proponents of both were Christian, white, and male, and assumed heterosexual relations as the norm—consequently they also classified gender distinctions and sexual normativity.

In both cases, geo- and body-politics (understood as the biographic configuration of gender, religion, class, ethnicity, and language) of knowledge-configuration and epistemic desires were hidden, and the accent placed on the mind in relation to God and in relation to Reason. Thus was the enunciation of Western epistemology configured, and thus was the structure of the enunciation holding together the colonial matrix. Consequently, decolonial thinking and doing focus on the enunciation, engaging in epistemic disobedience and delinking from the colonial matrix in order to open up decolonial options—a vision of life and society that requires decolonial subjects, decolonial knowledges, and decolonial institutions.

Decolonial thinking and options (i.e., thinking decolonially) are nothing more than a relentless analytic effort to understand, in order to overcome, the logic of coloniality underneath the rhetoric of modernity, the structure of management and control that emerged out of the transformation of the economy in the Atlantic, and the jump in knowledge that took place both in the internal history of Europe and in between Europe and its colonies, as we will see below. Needless to say, it is not this book, nor any other or many of them, on decoloniality that will make the difference, if we (intellectuals, scholars, journalists) do not follow the lead of the emerging global political society (referred to as “social movements”). Take, for instance, the question of “nature” (which could also be flagged as the fifth domain of the colonial matrix, rather than consider it as part of the economic domain). During the past ten years, the question of nature has been debated in the collective modernity/coloniality. Shall we consider nature as a fifth sphere or, as Quijano suggested, as part of the economic sphere? It so happened that the contemplation of Pachamama (for Western minds “nature”) in the new constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador was incorporated not due to green movements, to the theology of liberation, or to Marxist anti-capitalism, but because of the simple fact and thinking of indigenous communities, leaders, and indigenous intellectuals. Now, this is part of the struggle for the control of the colonial matrix of power based on the concept of “nature” or, on the contrary, delinking from it by arguing decolonially on the basis of the concept of “Pachamama.” There is no entity out there that is “better” understood as one or the other. There are different epistemic and political conceptualizations in the struggle for global futures. Thus the question is not so much where do we “file” nature as what are the issues that emerge from the analytic of the coloniality of nature (that is, its control and management) and in decolonial thinking and doing on environmental issues. There are joint efforts to contemplate, in the sense that scholarly decolonial thinkers contribute through our limited experiences and areas of knowledge to decolonial thinkers in the field, that is, in the political society and in the state, as the cases of Bolivia and, in a certain sense, of Ecuador illustrate.

We, scholars and decolonial thinkers, can contribute not by telling indigenous scholars, intellectuals, and leaders what the problem is, since they know it better than we do (and better than Al Gore does, for that matter), but by acting in the hegemonic domain of scholarship, wherein the idea

of nature as something outside human beings has been consolidated and persists. Decolonizing knowledge consists precisely in this type of research. The next step would be to build decolonial options on the ruins of imperial knowledge. Two examples come to mind.

First, when in 1590 the Jesuit Father José de Acosta published *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, “nature” was, in Christian European cosmology, something to know; understanding nature was tantamount to understanding its creator, God. But the Aymaras and Quechuas had no such metaphysics; consequently, there was no concept comparable to the Western concept of “nature.” Instead they relied on “Pachamama,” a concept that Western Christians did not have. Pachamama was how Quechuan and Aymaran *amauta* and *yatiris*—*amautas* and *yatiris* were the silenced intellectual equivalents of *theologian* (Acosta)—understood the human relationship with life, with that energy that engenders and maintains life, today translated as mother earth. The phenomenon that Western Christians described as “nature” existed in contradistinction to “culture”; furthermore, it was conceived as something outside the human subject. For Aymaras and Quechuas, more-than-human phenomena (as well as human beings) were conceived as Pachamama; and, in this conception, there was not, and there is not today, a distinction between “nature” and “culture.” Aymaras and Quechuas saw themselves *in* it, not separated *from* it. As such, culture was nature and nature was (and is) culture. Thus the initial moment of the colonial revolution was to implant the Western concept of nature and to rule out the Aymara and Quechua concept of Pachamama.¹¹ This was basically how colonialism was introduced into the domain of knowledge and subjectivity. Twenty years after Acosta, Sir Francis Bacon published his *Novum Organum* (1620), in which he proposed a reorganization of knowledge and clearly stated that “nature” was “there” to be dominated by Man. During this period, before the Industrial Revolution, Western Christians asserted their control over knowledge about nature by disqualifying all coexisting and equally valid concepts of knowledge and by ignoring concepts that contradicted their own understanding of nature. At the same time, they engaged in an economy of brutal resource extraction (gold and silver and other metals) for a new type of global market. They also undertook a macroeconomy of plantation, harvest, and regeneration (sugar, tobacco, cotton, etc.) and did so without transgenic incentives, which engrossed the banks

of Manchester, Liverpool, and London such that taking loans from Genoa bankers (as was the norm in Spain in the first half of the sixteenth century) was unnecessary.

Second, once “nature” became an established concept, the relation of man to nature displaced the European medieval concept of labor as well as all other ideas and uses of labor in Tawantinsuyu (to which Guaman Poma de Ayala devoted the last forty or so drawings of his *Nueva corónica y buen gobierno* [1616]). Working to live (or living labor, in Marx’s conceptualization) began to mutate into enslaved and then waged labor. Similar cases can be found (beyond the history of Europe and its colonies) in the Islamic world and in China. All these cases worldwide had two features in common: labor was necessary to live and was not engulfed in the colonial matrix of power that transformed living labor into slavery and waged labor (enslaved and waged labor became naturalized in the process of creating an economy of accumulation that is today recognized as capitalist economic mentality). Before this, living was the necessary precondition to work. This transformation resulted in extensive enslaved trade that transformed human life into a commodity—for the owner of the plantation, of the mine, and, later on, of the industry.

The next step was the Industrial Revolution: the meaning of “nature” in Acosta and Bacon changed, coming to refer to “natural resources,” the food necessary to nourish the machines of the Industrial Revolution that produced other machines (railroad and automobile) that required more food, charcoal, and oil. “Environmental catastrophe” started at this moment. While regeneration of life before the Industrial Revolution still sustained a friendly relation between the Western man of culture and the integration of labor and nature on which he built his culture, the distance grew after the Industrial Revolution and all other civilizations were relegated, in the eyes of Western men, increasingly to the past. “Nature”—broadly conceived—mutated into “natural resources”: while “nature”—as a concrete noun that names the physical non-human world—became in the New World the basis for the cultivation of sugar, tobacco, cotton, and so forth. In other words, the concept mutated into one referring to the source of natural resources (charcoal, oil, gas) that fueled the machines of the Industrial Revolution; that is, “nature” became a repository of objectified, neutralized, and largely inert materiality that existed for the fulfillment of the economic goals of

the “masters” of the materials. The legacy of this transformation lives today, in our assumption that “nature” is the provider of “natural resources” for daily survival: water as a bottled commodity. The mutation of nature into natural resources in the West was a sign of progress and modernization and at the same time a sign that other civilizations stagnated and were falling behind the West. Such images were pure and simple narrative constructions; that is, they were assumed to be realities represented in the domain of knowledge, and knowledge was the basic and powerful tool used both to control authority and to be transferred as a commodity. Knowledge in the colonial matrix of power was a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it was the mediation to the ontology of the world as well as a way of being in the world (subjectivity). On the other hand, as far as knowledge was conceived imperially as true knowledge, it became a commodity to be exported to those whose knowledge was deviant or non-modern according to Christian theology and, later on, secular philosophy and sciences. This combination was successful enough, in terms of the amassing of wealth and power, that by the end of the nineteenth century China and India had to confront the fact that Western men and institutions saw them as (i.e., built knowledge in such a way that they came to be regarded as) lagging behind historically; and history, for the West, was equal to modernity. Consequently, Western knowledge became a commodity of exportation for the modernization of the non-Western world.

Coloniality wrapped up “nature” and “natural resources” in a complex system of Western cosmology, structured theologically and secularly; it also manufactured an epistemological system that legitimized its uses of “nature” to generate massive quantities of “produce,” first, and massive quantities of “natural resources” after the Industrial Revolution. The first was still the period of regeneration; with the second we entered the period of recycling. The industrial and the technological revolution also made possible the industrialization of “produce” and the mercantilization of food and life.¹²

It is already possible, through the research conducted recently, to trace the stages and transformations of the colonial matrix over the past five hundred years, in each of its spheres and in mutual relations of interdependence. I will offer you more examples that I have developed elsewhere.¹³

First, the logic of coloniality (that is, the logic that held together the different spheres of the matrix) went through successive and cumulative stages

presented positively in the rhetoric of modernity: specifically, in the terms salvation, progress, development, modernization, and democracy. The initial stage deployed the rhetoric of modernity as salvation. Salvation was focused on saving the souls through conversion to Christianity. The second stage involved the control of the souls of the non-European through the civilizing mission outside Europe and management of bodies in emerging nation-states through the set of techniques that Foucault analyzed as bio-politics. Thus, coloniality was (and still is) the missing complementary half of bio-politics. This transformation of the rhetoric of salvation and the logic of control became prevalent during the period of the secular nation-state. Theo-politics mutated into ego-politics. The third stage—a stage that continues today—began the moment the corporations and the market became dominant; biotechnology displaced eugenics; and advertising bombarding TV, on the streets, on newspapers, and the internet, displaced the radio. Consequently, the healthy European citizen and the healthy minority in the colonies, who were managed and controlled through eugenics in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, have now been converted into “consumer entrepreneurs” of their own health by the uses of bio-technology complicit with pharmacology. The well-known insistence of former president George W. Bush to privatize health insurance and to make each citizen a private entrepreneur and a consumer of pharmaceutical and biotechnological “advancement” has been very well documented, in facts and arguments, by Nikolas Rose’s description of the politics of life itself.¹⁴ One consequence of the corporate stage in controlling bodies and converting citizens into health-consumers (that is, the politics of life itself, rather than bio-politics) is that it has engendered the “medical mafia.” The stage of the politics of life itself in developed countries is indeed quite different. Here modernity cannot be separated from development, as we saw in the epigraph by Wang Hui. Rose, sometimes apologetically and sometimes in bad faith, recognizes that the politics of life itself is basically implemented in developed countries; that is, it is marketed to the minority of Western Europe and U.S. elite middle-class consumers. For the rest of the world (with the exception of each country’s elite in the circle of westernization), the mutation has been from civilization to development: salvation by conversion to Christianity or assenting to Western civilization as it mutated into economic development, which was a conversion to Western economic principles, such as those of the Washington Consensus.

Second, in the sphere of epistemology, coloniality had its foundation in theology, that is, in the theo-politics of knowledge. Secularism displaced God as the guarantor of knowledge, placing Man and Reason in God’s stead, and centralized the Ego. Ego-politics (the overarching cosmology on which bio-politics was founded) then displaced theo-politics (whose concern was the control of the soul, not of the body), but, in the last analysis, both joined forces to maintain the epistemic and political control of the colonial matrix. Carl Schmitt saw it clearly: political theology, said Schmitt, is not a metaphysical issue, but rather a well-grounded structure based on categories of knowledge, vision, and institutional configuration.¹⁵ The technological revolution together with the corporate values that were prioritized in Western Europe and the United States (I leave Japan in suspension for the time being) made management itself the prime center of social life and knowledge. Corporate values require efficiency—the more you produce, the larger the gains, the happier you are supposed to be. And technology has trained its own experts who are paid to “improve” technological management of everything. In the case of nurturing and education, the technological revolution is creating a new type of subject whose “knowledge” consists in spending time to package “knowledge” according to the technological options on the menu. “Technological thinking” takes the place of thinking in general and of disciplines like philosophy and the philosophical aspect of all knowledge, reducing them to a technological packaging of options. Nevertheless, this is happening to only a small percentage of the global population: the population that has the “privilege and the benefit” of economic and energy resources that enable them to “enjoy” technology. There is perhaps 80 percent or so of the world population for whom technology is not available, and the question for the future would be whether they would have access to technological menus. Will there always be at least an 80 percent rate of exclusion? Or will the 80 percent become aware that they form the majority of the population of the planet and perhaps build a world in which technology will be at the service of humanity, instead of men and women being at the service of technology. These will be the first moments of the decolonial education.¹⁶ In the meantime rewesternization (see chapter 1) means that human beings will continue to be at the service of technology and therefore the reproduction of the colonial matrix of power (CMP) will continue.¹⁷

I have provided two hindights on the logic of coloniality, a scheme of its structure, and a few examples of its historical foundation and transformation

through five hundred years of the birth and histories of Western civilization and its imperial expansion. Needless to say, I am stating that the colonial matrix of power is the very foundational structure of Western civilization. Let me now give some more specific details of the levels at which the logic of coloniality operates. It is possible to identify a number of specific historico-structural nodes in which we can see the hierarchical structure of each node. Quijano's concept of heterogenous historico-structural nodes will be understood as a state wherein any pair of items is likely to be related in two or more differing ways. In a pedagogical formula it could be said that historico-structural nodes are heterarchical, but to say so we have to decolonize the concept of heterarchy (which is defined in universal terms) and understand heterarchies crossed by the colonial and imperial differences. Once we do that, decolonized heterarchy mutates into heterogenous historico-structural nodes, crossed by colonial and imperial differences.¹⁸ We have thus changed epistemic terrain to further describe the colonial matrix as a logical structure that underlines the totality of Western civilization; it is a managerial logic that by now has gone beyond the actors who have created and managed it—and, in a sense, it is the colonial matrix that has managed the actors and all of us. We are all in the matrix, each node is interconnected with all the rest, and the matrix cannot be observed and described by an observed located outside the matrix that cannot be observed—that observer will be either the God of Christian theology or the Subject of secular Reason.

Coming back to the heterogenous historic-structural nodes by which I have displaced heterarchy and changing epistemic terrain: I will first enumerate such nodes and then follow up with a few examples to illustrate their inter-relations. The order in which I will present them can be modified, for some will argue that economy and class relations are the foundation of hierarchies in societies, and others will argue that it is racial classification and the particular subjectivity and control of knowledge that makes possible such hierarchy through colonial and imperial differences. The colonial matrix (which manifests itself in the rhetoric of modernity that hides the logic of coloniality), remember, is tantamount to Western civilization as built in the past five hundred years, originating in the Atlantic, then expanding and encroaching on other civilizations justified by the colonial and imperial differences. Thus, the colonial matrix is built and operates on a series of interconnected heterogenous historico-structural nodes, bounded

by the “/” that divides and unites modernity/coloniality, imperial laws/colonial rules, center/peripheries, that are the consequences of global linear thinking in the foundation of the modern/colonial world (see chapter 2). Its legitimacy is anchored in the principles of diverse knowledges as well as in the apparatus of enunciation, which consists of categories of thought, social actors, and institutions held together through the continuity of education. Decolonial thinking and doing starts from the analytic of the levels and spheres in which it can be effective in the process of decolonization and liberation *from* the colonial matrix.

CMP then operates in a series of interconnected heterogenous historico-structural nodes crossed by colonial and imperial differences and by the underlying logic that secures those connections: the logic of coloniality, which I hope will become more visible in the remaining pages of this book. Historico-structural nodes mean that no one is independent of any other, as any node is likely to be related in two or more differing ways. The analytic of coloniality (decolonial thinking) consists in the relentless work of unveiling how the matrix works. And the decolonial option is the relentless project of getting us all out of the mirage of modernity and the trap of coloniality. They all connect through the logic that generates, reproduces, modifies, and maintains interconnected hierarchies. For that reason, I start with the racial historico-structural node in which the colonial and imperial differences have been anchored. Colonial and imperial differences have also shaped patriarchal relations since gender and sexual hierarchical relations very much depend, in the modern/colonial world, on racial classification. A white woman in the colonies, for example, is in a position to dominate a man of color. And a woman of color, in the colonies, would most likely join her ethnically exploited male companion rather than join the white woman who exploits and dominates him. Let's then enumerate some historico-structural nodes, keeping in mind that each node is not a universal instance but that each of them are constantly being articulated through the colonial and imperial difference.¹⁹

1 A global racial formation whose point of origination was Christian Spain in its double and simultaneous classification: the Moors and the Jews in Europe and the Indians and Africans across the Atlantic.²⁰

2 A particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labor (slavery, semi-serfdom, wage labor, petty-commodity production, etc.) were to

- coexist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market. This particular global structure originated in the sixteenth century.
- 3 An international division of labor of core and periphery where capital organized labor at the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms.²¹ International division of labor was supported by the ordination of international law (de Vitoria, Grotius) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²²
 - 4 An inter-state system of politico-military organizations controlled by Euro-American males and institutionalized in colonial administrations (comparable to NATO).²³
 - 5 A global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileged European people over non-European people.²⁴ While politico-military organizations were known in Europe and other parts of the world, in the sixteenth century politico-military organizations became entrenched with international law.²⁵
 - 6 A global gender/sex hierarchy that privileged males over females and European patriarchy over other forms of gender configuration and sexual relations.²⁶ A system that imposed the concept of “woman” to reorganize gender/sexual relations in the European colonies, effectively introducing regulations for “normal” relations among the sexes and the hierarchical distinctions between “man” and “woman.”²⁷
 - 7 Consequently, the colonial system invented also the categories “homosexual” and “heterosexual” (e.g., Las Casas’s [in]famous expression “el pecado nefando”), just as it invented the category “man” and “woman.” This invention makes “homophobia” irrelevant for describing Maya, Aztec, or Inca civilizations, since in these civilizations gender/sexual organizations were cast in different categories, which Spaniards (and Europeans, in general, whether Christian or secular) were either unable to see or unwilling to accept. There was no homophobia, as indigenous people did not think in these types of categories.²⁸
 - 8 A spiritual/religious hierarchy that privileged Christian over non-Christian/non-Western spiritualities was institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian (Catholic and later Protestant) Church; by the same token, coloniality of knowledge translated other ethical and spiritual practices around the world as “religion,” an invention that was also accepted by “natives” (Hinduism was invented as religion only in the eighteenth century).²⁹

- 9 An aesthetic hierarchy (art, literature, theater, opera) that through respective institutions (museums, school of beaux arts, opera houses, glossy paper magazines with splendid reproductions of paintings) manages the senses and shapes sensibilities by establishing norms of the beautiful and the sublime, of what art is and what it is not, what shall be included and what shall be excluded, what shall be awarded and what shall be ignored.³⁰
- 10 An epistemic hierarchy that privileged Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies was institutionalized in the global university system, publishing houses, and *Encyclopedia Britannica*, on paper and online.³¹
- 11 A linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages privileged communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and subalternized the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture, but not of knowledge/theory.³²
- 12 A particular conception of the “modern subject,” an idea of Man, introduced in the European Renaissance, became the model for the Human and for Humanity, and the point of reference for racial classification and global racism.³³

Let’s take the example of language, knowledge, racism, authority, and economy creating heterogenous historico-structural nodes that transform themselves and yet remain, maintaining the logic of coloniality: the context and the content changes, but the logic remains (see afterword). I have argued this point several times in the past. Following up on Quijanos’s statement that Eurocentrism is a question not of geography but of epistemology, I have backed up this dictum with the observation that Western knowledge is founded in two classic languages (Greek and Latin) and unfolded in the six modern/colonial and imperial European languages: Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese (the vernacular languages of the Renaissance and early foundation of modernity/coloniality) and French, German, and English (the three vernacular languages that have dominated from the Enlightenment to this day).³⁴ Eurocentrism (as imperial knowledge whose point of origination was Europe) could be found and reproduced in the colonies and ex-colonies, as well as in locales that have not been directly colonized (routes of dispersion). Eurocentrism is, for example, easily found in Colombia, Chile, or Argentina, in China or in India, which doesn’t mean that

these places are, in their entirety, Eurocentric. Certainly not. One will not say that Bolivia is in totality Eurocentric. However, it couldn't be denied that traces of Eurocentrism are alive and well in Bolivia, in both the Right and the Left, politically and epistemically. The same considerations could be made with respect to China. It will be difficult to convince any one that China is a Eurocentered country, although no one will dispute that the traces of Eurocentrism are still alive and well in China. The linguistic hierarchy in which Eurocentrism has been founded—which leaves out of the game Arabic, Hindi, Russian, Urdu, Aymara, Quechua, Bambara, Hebrew, and so on—controls knowledge not only through the dominance of the languages themselves, but through the categories on which thought is based. Therefore, border epistemology emerges from the exteriority (not the outside, but the outside invented in the process of creating the identity of the inside, that is Christian Europe) of the modern/colonial world, from bodies squeezed between imperial languages and those languages and categories of thought negated by and expelled from the house of imperial knowledge. If we explore how aesthetics have been conceived and defended and art practiced in the eighteenth century, we will see that the hierarchy of languages goes hand in hand with the hierarchy of knowledge and of art and literature. However, and since the Renaissance, literature and painting held hands in the concept of “representation” and in the belief in the direct connection between “words and things,” as Foucault explained. Consequently, literature and painting set the rules by which to judge and evaluate written expressions and visual figurations not only in Europe, but, above all, in the non-European world. While arts and literatures were already flourishing in Italy in the fifteenth century, this flourishing was connected to the economic well being of Italy, which was based on three financial and commercial cities: Florence, Venice, and Genoa. That foundation was crucial in the sixteenth century, when European men and institutions began to populate the Americas, founding universities and establishing a system of knowledge, training Indians to paint churches and to legitimize artistic principles and practices that were connected with the symbolic in the control of authority and with the economic in the mutual complicity between economic wealth and the splendors of the arts. From the seventeenth century, European colonies provided the raw material for the foundation of museums of curiosities (Kunstkamera), which later on divided pieces from the non-European

world (museums of natural history, of anthropology) from museums of art (primarily European, from the Renaissance on).

The Argument to Come

Chapter 1 lays out the groundwork, outlining five wide trajectories that will shape global futures for many decades to come, perhaps the entire twenty-first century. I describe these five projects as rewesternization, the reorientation of the Left, dewesternization, decoloniality or the decolonial option, and spirituality or the spiritual option. I am not looking for a winner. These trajectories and options coexist and will coexist in conflictive and/or diplomatic relations, some will be compatible with others and others will be incompatible. I am just saying that there is not and cannot be a winner anymore. “Terrorism” and “Wikileaks” are two examples of the point of no return, and the point of no return is that there is no longer a place in this world for one and only one trajectory to reign over the others. *Imperium* has run its course and global futures are being built in which many trajectories and options will be available; however, there will be no place of one option to pretend to be *the* option. The decolonial option is not aiming to be *the* one. It is just an option that, beyond asserting itself as such, makes clear that all the rest are also options, and, not simply the irrevocable truth of history that has to be imposed by force and fire. That is simply the political treatise, in one sentence, written by the EZLN: a world in which many worlds will coexist. Chapters 2 and 3 move toward decolonial thinking, the historical foundation of decoloniality, and the decolonial option. Both chapters 2 and 3 explore in depth geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge confronting (e.g., looking into the eyes of) theo- and ego-politics of knowledge (that is, modern/imperial knowledge). Chapters 4 and 5 offer decolonial readings of two basic concepts in the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality: space and time. Colonization of time and space are foundational for the rhetoric of modernity: the Renaissance colonized time by inventing the Middle Ages and Antiquity, thus placing itself at the unavoidable present of history and setting the stage for Europe becoming the center of space. Hegel concluded this narrative by having a main character, the Spirit traveling from the East and landing in the presents of Germany and Europe, the center of the world. The rhetoric of modernity displaces

previous similar conceptions of space and time, the many “firsts” *nomos* of the earth: Beijing was the middle kingdom, as were Jerusalem and, later on, Mecca and Medina for Islam; Cuzco for the Incas; and Tenochtitlan for the Aztecs. Chapter 4 delves into coloniality and colonization of time—that is, Western time. If the Renaissance invented the Middle Ages and Antiquity, installing the logic of coloniality by colonizing its own past (and stored it as its own tradition), the Enlightenment (and the growing dominance of the British) invented Greenwich, remapping the logic of coloniality and colonizing space, with Greenwich as the zero point of global time. Chapter 5 follows up by examining the coloniality (the logic) and colonization (the enactment) of space in Immanuel Kant’s *Geography*. It also follows up on chapters 5 and 6 in *The Darker Side of the Renaissance*, in which I previously examined the colonization of space. At the time Kant was delivering his lessons in geography (in the second half of the eighteenth century), the feeling that Hegel developed a few decades later was already in place: Germany was for both Hegel and Kant the equivalent of what Cuzco was in the organization of Tawantinsuyu or Beijing as the Middle Kingdom of the China Dynastic organization. Germany was, in other words, the Cuzco and Beijing of Europe. Kant and Hegel placed themselves and are well installed in the secularization of the epistemology of the *zero point* (see chapters 2 and 3 herein): the observers observing the valley from the top of the mountain. Shall I call this *panopticon*? Not necessarily: decolonially I am talking about the *hubris of the zero point*. I am talking about different histories, conditions, sensibilities, and epistemologies, since I do not believe in the universality of concepts that have been useful to account for a local history, even if that local history is the history of the point of origination of the idea of modernity and of the imperial routes of dispersion. Once again, geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge coexist with ego-politics, in which language and experience—the *panopticon*—was brought into the picture. Chapters 6 and 7 continue the decolonial argument that was introduced in chapters 2 and 3, and advanced in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6, on the Zapatista’s theoretical revolution, highlights the unity of *doing through thinking* and *thinking through doing*, replacing and displacing the distinction between theory and practice. There are many issues that have unfolded since the initial Zapatista uprising, within the movement itself, within Mexico (e.g., *la otra campaña*, the creation of Caracoles, the Festival

de la Digna Rabia, etc.), and outside the borders of Mexico (the government of Evo Morales, the indigenous movements in Ecuador).³⁵ My argument is not historical or sociological, but theoretical. Chapter 6 prepares the terrain for chapter 7 on cosmopolitanism and the decolonial option. The point is that while Kant’s cosmopolitanism was conceived centrifugally (e.g., a cosmopolitan world designed and lead by and from Europe), the future demands decolonial cosmopolitanism, rather than imperial cosmopolitanism, for who will indeed take to the field and map, from the top of the hill, a new and good cosmopolitan order? Decolonial cosmopolitanism should be thought of as cosmopolitan localism, an oxymoron for sure, but an oxymoron that breaks away, delinks, from the imperial bend of Kantian cosmopolitan legacies. Cosmopolitan localism names the connector for global and pluriversal projects, where all existing nation-states and future organizations that will replace, displace, or redo current forms of nation-states, as well as the emerging political society will participate (by whatever form of organization) to a truly cosmopolitan world. This global project, without a single leader, without the G7, G8, or G20, would be—contrary to Kant—pluriversal rather than universal.

The afterword is both a conclusion and an opening up to the decolonial option and to planetary communal orders. Planetary communal “orders” are based on pluriversality as a universal project, as argued in the chapters 6 and 7, rather than on a “communal global order” (a commonwealth or a universal commons) that would be monocentric, universal, and endorse the imperialism of objectivity and truth without parenthesis. This premise is crucial to understanding my argument, for if you read my argument with the expectations created by modernity (from the Left and from the Right)—that a global order is necessary and that global order is equated with *one* project, then you will miss the main point and get derailed in your interpretation. The global order I am advocating is pluriversal, not universal. And that means to take pluriversality as a universal project to which all contending options would have to accept. And accepting it only requires us to put ourselves, as persons, states, institutions, in the place, as Ottobah Cugoano stated, no human being has the right to dominate and be imposed over other human being. It is that simple and it is so difficult. To move in that direction we need to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms, and not just the content, of the conversation means to think and

act decolonially. Much has to be done, but the growing global political society indicates that decolonial options will increase exponentially and by so doing will contribute to remapping the end of the road to which Western civilization and the colonial matrix of power has led us.³⁶ Once again, the goal of decolonial options is not to take over, but to make clear, by thinking and doing, that global futures can no longer be thought of as one global future in which only one option is available; after all, when only one option is available, "option" entirely loses its meaning.

Part One